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Abstract
I extend the Grossman and Lai (2004) model to answer the question, “Would global
patent protection be too weak without international coordination?” by introducing ﬁrm-
biased government preferences and trade barriers in the model. I make use of the es-
timates of the ﬁrm-bias parameter from the political economy literature to proxy for
t h ed e g r e eo fg o v e r n m e n t s ’ﬁrm-bias. Then I calculate the range of trade barriers that
is suﬃcient to give rise to under-protection of patents in the global system without in-
ternational policy coordination in IPR protection. I make the judgement that the true
trade barrier between countries very likely falls within this range of under-protection.
Therefore, I conclude that there was probably under-protection of patents without in-
ternational policy coordination in IPR protection. It means that the free-rider problem
with a large number of independent players overrides the eﬀects of ﬁrm-bias and trade
barriers, giving rise to too low a rate of innovation in the world. Allowing for the possibil-
ity that countries discriminate against foreign ﬁrms in Nash equilibrium does not change
this conclusion. The problem can possibly be corrected by international coordination in
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.
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of Hong Kong.1 Introduction
The global intellectual property rights (IPR) protection system was given a boost by
the implementation of the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights), which started a gradual process of IPR harmonization
in 1995. This agreement eﬀectively requires the strengthening of patent protection of
most countries, and forces the world IPR protection policies towards harmonization
(albeit a partial one). There have been nothing nearly as powerful as TRIPS in its
geographic coverage and its ability to enforce rulings, not least because of the large
number of countries involved and the credibility of the threat of punishment through
trade retaliation. Given the tremendous repercussions of such a coordinated increase in
the strengths of IPR protection, it is fair to ask whether TRIPS is really a solution to
a global coordination problem. It is clear that TRIPS has distributive eﬀect between
countries.1 However, the more important question is whether global IPR protection was
too weak before TRIPS. If it was, then TRIPS can potentially be welfare-improving from
the global point of view, and its inclusion in global trade talks would potentially facilitate
negotiations on liberalization of other sectors/areas. For example, if less developed
countries (LDCs) lose from TRIPS and developed countries (DCs) gain from TRIPS, but
the latter’s gains outweigh the former’s losses, then it can be mutually beneﬁcial for the
LDCs to accept harmonization of IPR standards with the DCs in exchange for the DCs’
opening their markets for labor-intensive manufacturing goods or agricultural products
from the LDCs. However, if global patent protection was already too strong before
TRIPS, then no such synergy exists between talks on trade-related IPR negotiations
and other issues/areas of global trade talks.
There is no doubt that some countries attempted to coordinate their IPR policies
somewhat even before TRIPS, but empirical studies have shown that even as late as 1990,
market sizes and innovative capabilities signiﬁcantly aﬀect variation in the strengths of
1McCalman (2001) has shown that the US was by far the largest beneﬁciary, followed by Germany
and France as distant second and third beneﬁciaries. On the other hand, the greatest loser was Canada,
followed by Brazil and UK.
1patent protection across the world, as predicted by non-cooperative game theory.2 So, I
start with the working assumption that the world was in a non-cooperative equilibrium
before TRIPS, and then ask, Would global patent protection be too weak when left to
individual governments to decide its own level of protection?
To answer this question, we need to (a) have a theory that explains how global
patent protection was determined in a non-cooperative equilibrium; (b) have a theory
that explains how the optimal global patent pr o t e c t i o ni sd e t e r m i n e d ;a n d( c )d e v e l o pa
suﬃcient condition for global under-protection (or over-protection) of IPR. In order to
answer (c), we need to explain how a global system of patent protection aﬀects incen-
tives to innovate and how it creates distortions (deadweight losses). Therefore, we need
to answer (a) and (b) ﬁrst. To do so, I modify and extend a model by Grossman and
Lai (2004). In Section 2, I shall re-state their theory in a succinct form. Then, I de-
velop an extension that allows us to more realistically evaluate whether non-cooperative
equilibrium gives rise to under-protection of IPR.
In the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004), countries play a Nash game in setting
the strengths of patent protection. The best response function of a country’s govern-
ment is obtained by setting the strength of patent protection that equates the marginal
costs (deadweight loss due to longer duration of monopoly pricing) and marginal ben-
eﬁts (increased incentives of innovation) of extending protection, given the strengths
of protection of other countries. Each country conveys positive externalities to foreign
countries as it extends patent protection, since it increases proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms in
the home market, and increases consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced
innovations. As a result, there is under-protection of patent rights in Nash equilibrium
relative to the global optimum. In fact, the degree of under-protection in Nash equi-
librium increases with the number of independent decision-makers in the patent-setting
game.
However, two factors prevents us from directly applying Grossman and Lai’s (2004)
basic model to answer the question posed in the title of this paper: “Would global patent
protection be too weak without international coordination?”. First is that governments
2See, for example, Ginarte and Park (1997) and Maskus (2000a).
2may put extra weight on proﬁts as opposed to consumer surplus (e.g. due to ﬁrm lob-
bying). When governments put more weight on proﬁts, the marginal cost of patent pro-
tection decreases since deadweight loss is smaller. Therefore, patent protection in Nash
equilibrium is stronger. I shall call this ﬁrm-biased preferences of governments. Second
is the existence of trade barriers. When a ﬁrm has only a fraction of the penetration
rate in a foreign market as compared to the domestic market (e.g. due to transportation
cost and other trade costs), the positive international externalities of patent protection
is diminished. Both factors tend to diminish the degree of under-protection in Nash
equilibrium relative to the global optimum. If these forces are strong enough, there
may even be over-protection of patents in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, whether or not
there was under-protection of patents in the non-cooperative equilibrium is an empirical
question. In this paper, I incorporate these two features in an extension of the basic
Grossman and Lai (2004) model and derive a suﬃcient condition for under-protection of
patent in the global economy. I then calibrate the model using the ﬁrm-bias parameter
estimated from the empirical literature and then ﬁnding out how small the trade barriers
have to be in order for there to be under-protection of patents in Nash equilibrium.
In the basic model, we can ﬁnd a functional relationship between the global strength
of patent protection and global welfare. The same strength of global patent protection
creates the same amount of total deadweight losses (what I call static losses) and ag-
gregate ﬂow of new diﬀerentiated goods (what I call dynamic gains) in each period. As
long as the global strength of patent protection is the same, global welfare is the same,
regardless of the combination of individual countries’ strengths of patent protection.
Therefore, the global optimum is a continuum of combinations of national strengths of
patent protection that maximize global welfare. However, this will not be true in the
extended model. In the more general model with trade barriers, there does not exist
a scalar measure of the global strength of patent protection such that there is a func-
tional relationship between the global strength of protection and global welfare. Despite
this problem, I am able to calculate a suﬃcient condition under which, starting from
Nash equilibrium, global welfare must increase with increases in the strengths of pro-
tection in all countries. When this condition is satisﬁed, we can conclude that there is
3under-protection in global IPR protection.
The key results of the extended model are: 1. There is only one single combina-
tion, not a continuum, of national strengths of patent protection that maximizes global
welfare. 2. Externalities still exist, but their magnitude decreases with trade barri-
ers. Therefore, the degree of under-protection decreases with trade barriers. 3. The
degree of under-protection decreases with the ﬁrm-bias of governments. 4. Based on
the estimates of the ﬁrm-bias parameter from the political economy literature, and our
judgement of the plausible magnitude of trade barrier, I conclude that under-protection
of global patent protection in the non-cooperative equilibrium is very likely.
Some argue that without an international agreement, countries have incentives to
discriminate against foreign ﬁrms by oﬀering lower patent protection to them. In other
words, there is no observance of national treatment in Nash equilibrium. I account
for this fact later in the paper. It is found that the condition for under-protection in
Nash equilibrium is less stringent than in the case with observance of national treatment
in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, allowing for non-observance of the national treatment
principle in equilibrium strengthens the argument that there is under-protection without
international coordination.
In section 2, I recap the essence of the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004).
In section 3, I extend the basic model to incorporate ﬁrm-bias and trade barriers. In
section 4, I account for the fact that countries can discriminate against foreign ﬁrms in
Nash equilibrium. Finally, I conclude in section 5.
2 A basic theory of international protection of IPR
The theory described in this section basically draws from Grossman and Lai (2004).
2.1 Noncooperative Patent Protection
In this section, I study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property in
a world economy with imitation and trade. We derive the Nash equilibria of a game in
which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and noncooperatively. The
4countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and their stocks of
human capital. The last of these proxies for their diﬀerent capacities for R&D. We shall
term the countries “North” and “South,” in keeping with our desire to understand the
tensions that surrounded the tightening of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
in the developing countries in the last decade. Keith E. Maskus (2000a, ch.3) has
documented an increase in innovative activity in poor and middle-income countries such
as Brazil, Korea, and China, so our model of relations between trading partners with
positive but diﬀerent abilities to conduct R&D may be apt for studying the incentives for
I P Rp r o t e c t i o ni naw o r l do ft r a d eb e t w e e ns u c hn a t i o n sa n dt h ed e v e l o p e de c o n o m i e s . 3
But our model may apply more broadly to relations between any groups of countries
that have diﬀerent wages and diﬀerent capacities for research. Such diﬀerences exist,
albeit to a lesser extent than between North and South, in the comparison of countries
in Northern and Southern Europe, or the comparison of the United States and Canada.
We do not mean the labels North and South to rule out the application of our analysis
to these other sorts of relationships.
2.1.1 The Global IPR Regime
Consumers in the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the rep-
resentative consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function. The instantaneous





where yj(z) is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country j at
time z, xj(i,z) is consumption of the ith diﬀerentiated product by a resident of country
j at time z, and nj(z) is the number of diﬀerentiated varieties previously invented in
country j that remain economically viable at time z.T h e r ea r eMN consumers in the
North and MS consumers in the South. While we do not place any restrictions on the
3He also shows the extent to which patent applications in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Korea,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are dominated by foreign ﬁrms, a feature of the data that ﬁgures
in our analysis.
5relative sizes of the two markets at this juncture, we shall be most interested in the case
where MN >M S.4 It does not matter for our analysis whether consumers can borrow
and lend internationally or not.
In country j,i tt a k e saj units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous
good or to produce one unit of any variety of the diﬀerentiated product. New goods
a r ei n v e n t e di ne a c hr e g i o na c c o r d i n gt oφj = F (Hj,L Rj/aj)=A(LRj/aj)
b H
1−b
j ,w h e r e
Hj is an input whose quantity determines the innovative capability of country j, LRj is
the labor devoted to R&D there. We assume that aN <a S, which means that labor is
uniformly more productive in the North than in the South. We also assume that the
numeraire good is produced in positive quantities in both countries, so that wj =1 /aj
for j = S,N, and hence wN/wS = aS/aN > 1.D e ﬁne T =( 1− e−ρτ)/ρ,w h e r eτ is the
product life of a diﬀerentiated good.
We now describe the IPR regime. In each country, there is national treatment in the
granting of patent rights. Under national treatment, the government of country j aﬀords
the same protection Ωj = ωjTj to all inventors of diﬀerentiated products regardless of
their national origins, where ωj is the probability that a patent is enforced in country j
(or the fraction of country j’s market where a patent is enforced) at any moment in time,
Tj =( 1− e−ρτj)/ρ,a n dτj is the length of the patents granted by country j.I no t h e r
words, we assume that foreign ﬁrms and domestic ﬁrms have equal standing in applying
for patents in any country and that all patents are subject to the same enforcement
provisions. National treatment is required by TRIPS and it characterized the laws that
were in place in most countries even before this agreement.5 In our model, a patent
is an exclusive right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a ﬁx e dp e r i o do ft i m e
4We remind the reader that market size is meant to capture not the population of a country, but
rather the scale of its demand for innovative products.
5National treatment is required by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, to which 127 countries subscribed by the end of 1994 and 164 countries subscribe today (see
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/paris/index.html). There were, however, allegations from ﬁrms in
the United States and elsewhere that prior to the signing of TRIPS in 1994, nondiscriminatory laws
did not always mean nondiscriminatory practice. See Suzanne Scotchmer (2004) for an analysis of the
incentives that countries have to apply national treatment in the absence of an enforcible agreement.
6( s e eM a s k u s ,2 0 0 0 a ,p . 3 6 ) . T h i sm e a n st h a t ,w h e ng o o di is under patent protection
in country j,n oﬁrm other than the patent holder or one designated by it may legally
produce the good in country j for domestic sale or for export, nor may the good be
legally imported into country j from an unauthorized producer outside the country. We
also rule out parallel imports – unauthorized imports of good i that were produced by
the patent holder or its designee, but that were sold to a third party outside country j.6
When parallel imports are prevented, patent holders can practice price discrimination
across national markets.
We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies once-and-
for-all at time 0. These patents apply only to goods invented after time 0; goods invented
beforehand continue to receive the protections aﬀorded at their times of invention. So
long as the governments cannot remove protections that were previously granted, the
economy has no state variables that bear on its choice of optimal patent policies at
a given moment in time. This means that the Nash equilibrium in once-and-for-all
patents is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated game in which
the governments can change their patent policies periodically, or even continuously. Of
course, the repeated game may have other equilibria in which the governments base their
current policies on the history of prior actions. We do not investigate such equilibria
with tacit cooperation here, but rather postpone our discussion of cooperation until a
later section.
Let us describe, for given patent strengths ΩN and ΩS, the life cycle of a typical
diﬀerentiated product. During an initial phase after the product is introduced, the
inventor holds an active patent in both countries which is only partially enforced. The
patent holder earns an expected ﬂow of proﬁts of ωNMNπ from sales in the Northern
6The treatment of parallel imports under TRIPs remains a matter of legal controversy. Countries
continue to diﬀer in their rules for territorial exhaustion of IPRs. Some countries, like Australia and
Japan, practice international exhaustion, whereby the restrictive rights granted by a patent end with
the ﬁrst sale of the good anywhere in the world. Other countries or regions, like the United States and
the European Union, practice national or regional exhaustion, whereby patent rights end only with the
ﬁrst sale within the country or region. Under such rules, patent holders can prevent parallel trade. See
Maskus (2000b) for further discussion.
7market and an expected ﬂow of proﬁts of ωSMSπ from sales in the Southern market,
where π is earnings per consumer for a monopoly selling a typical brand. Notice that
monopoly proﬁts per consumer are the same for sales in both markets, because consumers
share identical preferences. Also, they do not depend on where a good was invented or
where it is produced, because the productivity gap between the countries exactly oﬀsets
t h ew a g ed i ﬀerential. Each Northern consumer realizes a ﬂow of expected surplus of
ωNCm +( 1− ωN)Cc from his purchases of the good, where Cm is the surplus that a
consumer derives from purchases of a good produced at a cost of wjaj =1and sold
at the monopoly price pm and Cc is the surplus he derives from a product sold for the
competitive price of pc =1 . Similarly, a Southern consumer realizes an expected ﬂow of
consumer surplus of ωSCm +( 1− ωS)Cc from his purchases of the good.
After a while, the patent will expire in one country. For concreteness, let’s say that
this happens ﬁrst in the South. Then the good will be legally imitated by competitive
ﬁrms producing there, for sales in the local (Southern) market. The imitators will not,
however, be able to sell the good legally in the North, because the live patent there, if
enforced, aﬀords protection from such infringing imports. When the patent expires in
the South, the price of the good falls permanently to wSaS =1 , and the original inventor
ceases to realize proﬁts in that market. The ﬂow of consumer surplus in the South rises
to MSCc.
Eventually, the inventor’s patent expires in the North. Then the Northern market
c a nb es e r v e dc o m p l e t e l yb yc o m p e t i t i v eﬁrms producing in either location. At this time,
the price of the good in the North falls to pc =1and households there begin to enjoy the
higher ﬂow of consumer surplus MNCc. The original inventor loses his remaining source
of monopoly income. Finally, after a period of length ¯ τ has elapsed from the moment of
invention, the good becomes obsolete and all ﬂows of consumer surplus cease.
2.1.2 The Best Response Functions
Consider the choice of patent policies ΩN and ΩS that will take eﬀect at time 0 and
apply to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for the aggregate welfare in country
8i, discounted to time 0, is given by
























π(MSΩS + MNΩN),f o r i = S,N, (2)
where Λi0 is the ﬁxed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in country i derive
f r o mg o o d st h a tw e r ei n v e n t e db e f o r et i m e0 .T h es e c o n de q u a l i t ya r i s e sf r o mt h ef a c t
that there is zero proﬁtf o re a c hﬁrm, so that riHi+wiLRi = φiv = φiπ(MSΩS + MNΩN),
where v =( MSΩS + MNΩN)π is the value of a new patent.
We are now ready to derive the best response functions for the two governments.
The best response expresses the strength of patent protection that maximizes a country’s
aggregate welfare as a function of the given patent policy of its trading partner. Consider
t h ec h o i c eo fΩS by the government of the South. This country bears two costs from
strengthening its patent protection slightly. First, it expands the fraction of goods
previously invented in the South on which the country suﬀers a static deadweight loss of
MS(Cc −Cm −π). Second, it augments the fraction of goods previously invented in the
North on which its consumers realize surplus of MSCm instead of MSCc.N o t i c e t h a t
the proﬁts earned by Northern producers in the South are not an oﬀset to this latter
marginal cost, because they accrue to patent holders in the North. The marginal beneﬁt
that comes to the South from strengthening its patent protection reﬂects the increased
incentive that Northern and Southern ﬁr m sh a v et oe n g a g ei nR & D .I ft h ew e l f a r e -
maximizing ΩS is positive and less than ¯ T, then the marginal beneﬁt per consumer of
increasing ΩS must match the marginal cost, which implies





CmΩS + Cc(¯ T − ΩS)
¤
,( 3 )
where γj is the responsiveness of innovation in region j to changes in the value of a





Similarly, in the North, the marginal beneﬁt of strengthening patent protection must
match the marginal cost at any interior point on the best response curve. The marginal
9cost in the North is diﬀerent from that in the South, because the North’s national
income includes the proﬁts earned by Northern patent holders but not those earned by
Southern patent holders. The marginal beneﬁtd i ﬀers too, because the eﬀectiveness of
patent policy as a tool for promoting innovation varies according to the importance of a
country’s market in the aggregate proﬁts of potential innovators and because the surplus
from a typical product over its lifetime depends upon a country’s patent regime. The
condition for the best response of the North, analogous to (3) above, is





CmΩN + Cc(¯ T − ΩN)
¤
.( 4 )
Noting that γS = γN = γ, 7 the two best response functions can be written similarly
as









for i = S,N,( 5 )
where μi = φi/(φS + φN) is the share of world innovation that takes place in country
i.M o r e o v e r ,μi = Hi/(HS + HN) for this research technology. Thus, both μi and γ are
independent of the patent policies in the Cobb-Douglas case. It follows from (5) that
the best response functions are linear and downward sloping in this case, and that the
best response function for the South is steeper than that for the North, when the two
are drawn in (ΩS,ΩN) space.
Thus, the patent policies of the two countries are strategic substitutes. To under-
stand the strategic interdependence between the governments in choosing their policies,
consider the choice of patent protection by the South. Suppose the North were to
strengthen its patent protection; i.e., to increase ΩN. This would shrink the fraction
of total discounted proﬁts that an innovator earns in the South and so, ceteris paribus,
reduce the responsiveness of global innovation to patent policy in the South. Moreover,
the increase in ΩN would draw labor into R&D in the North and South. If β<0,t h e
7The fact that the two supply elasticities γS and γN are equal despite the diﬀerences in human
capital endowments, in employment, and in labor productivity is a property of the Cobb-Douglas





10elasticity of innovation with respect to patent value would fall. The South would ﬁnd
that its market is relatively less important to potential innovators and that these inno-
vators are less responsive to its patent policy. For both reasons, the marginal beneﬁt
to the South of strengthening its patent protection would fall and so the government
would respond to the increase in ΩN with a reduction in patent length or an easing of
enforcement.
It is easy to show using (5) that the best response curve for the South must have a
slope that is everywhere greater in absolute value than MS/MN, while the best response
curve for the North must have a slope that is everywhere smaller in absolute value than
MS/MN.8 It follows that the curve for the South must be steeper than that for the
North at any point of intersection. This guarantees uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
and ensures stability of the policy setting game.
We summarize the most important ﬁndings in this section as follows.
Proposition 1 Let the research technology be φj = A(LRj/aj)
b H
1−b
j in country i,f o r
i = S,N. Since the two patent policies are strategic substitutes in both countries, there
exists a unique and stable Nash equilibrium of the policy setting game.
8We have not discussed the shape of the best response functions where they hit the axes or where
the constraint that Ωi ≤ ¯ T begins to bind. The best-response curve of the South becomes vertical if it
hits the vertical axis at a point below ΩN = ¯ T. It also becomes vertical if the South’s best response is
¯ T for some positive value of ΩN. Similarly, the best-response curve for the North becomes horizontal
if either it hits the horizontal axis before ΩS = ¯ T or if the North’s best response is ¯ T for some positive
value of ΩS. Thus, the best response curve for the South must be steeper than that for the North at
any point of intersection, even if these additional segments of the best response functions are taken into
account.
112.2 International Patent Agreements
In this section, we study international patent agreements.9 We begin by characterizing
the combinations of patent policies that are jointly eﬃcient for the two countries.10
Then we compare the Nash equilibrium outcomes with the eﬃcient policies, to identify
changes in the patent regime that ought to be eﬀected by an international treaty. Finally,
we address the issue of policy harmonization. By that point, we will have seen that
harmonization is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for global eﬃciency. We proceed to
investigate the distributional properties of an agreement calling for harmonized patent
policies and ask whether both countries would beneﬁtf r o ms u c ha na g r e e m e n ti nt h e
absence of some form of direct compensation.
2.2.1 Eﬃc i e n tP a t e n tR e g i m e s
We shall begin by showing that the sum of the welfare levels of the two countries depends
only on a measure Q of the overall protection aﬀorded by the international patent
system. This means that the same aggregate world welfare level can be achieved with
diﬀerent combinations of ΩS and ΩN that imply the same overall level of protection.
One particular level of Q–call it Q∗–maximizes the sum of the countries’ welfare levels.
For a wide range of distributions of world welfare, eﬃciency is achieved by setting the
individual patent policies so that the overall index of patent protection is Q∗.
In particular, let Q = MSΩS + MNΩN. This measure of global patent protection
weighs the degree of patent protection in each country by the size of the country’s market.
A ﬁrm that earns a ﬂow of expected proﬁts of ωSMSπ for a period of length τS in the
South and a ﬂow of expected proﬁts of ωNMNπ for a period of τN in the North earns
9See also McCalman (2002), who discusses globally eﬃcient patent policies in his two-country ex-
tension of the Nordhaus (1969) model. Lai and Qiu (2003) consider whether the joint welfare of the
two countries would be increased if the South were to extend its patents so as to be equal in length to
those chosen by the North in a Nash equilibrium.
10Ours is a constrained eﬃciency, because we assume that innovation must be done privately and that
patents are the only policies available to encourage R&D. We do not, for example, allow the governments
to introduce R&D subsidies, which if feasible, might allow them to achieve a given rate of innovation
with weaker patents and less deadweight loss.
12a total discounted sum of expected proﬁts equal to Qπ.T h u s ,Q governs the allocation
of resources to R&D in each country, regardless of the particular combination of patent
policies in the separate countries.
Consider the choice of patent policies ΩN and ΩS that will take eﬀect at time 0 and
apply to goods invented thereafter. Summing the welfare expressions in (2) for i = S
and i = N,w eﬁnd that
ρ[WS(0) + WN(0)] = ρ(ΛS0 + ΛN0)+wS(LS − LRS)+wN(LN − LRN)
+(MS + MN) ¯ T(φS + φN)Cc − Q(φS + φN)(Cc − Cm − π) (6)
Since vS = vN = πQ, LRS and LRN are functions of Q.11 T h es a m ei st r u eo fφS and
φN. I tf o l l o w st h a td i ﬀerent combinations of ΩS and ΩN that yield the same value of Q
also yield the same level of aggregate world welfare.12
If international transfer payments are feasible, then a globally eﬃcient patent regime
must have MSΩS + MNΩN = Q∗,w h e r eQ∗ is the value of Q that maximizes the right-
hand side of (6).13 Notice that a range of eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved without the
need for any international transfers. By appropriate choice of ΩN and ΩS,t h ec o u n t r i e s
can be given any welfare levels on the eﬃciency frontier between that which they would
achieve if ΩS =0and ΩN = Q∗/MN and that which they would achieve if ΩS = Q∗/MS
and ΩN =0 .14
11In country i, the allocation of labor to research is determined by
πQFL(LRi/ai,H i)=1 /ai.
12This result is anticipated by a similar one in McCalman (2002), who studied eﬃcient patent agree-
ments in a partial equilibrium model of cost-reducing innovation by a single, global monopolist.
13The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing ρ[WS(0) + WN(0)] implies








The second-order condition is satisﬁed at Q = Q∗ when β ≤ 1/2.
14This statement ignores the ceiling on patent lengths imposed by the ﬁnite economic life of dif-
ferentiated products. A more precise statement is that a range of distributions of maximal world
welfare can be achieved by varying ΩS between ΩS =m a x {0,(Q∗ − MN ¯ T)/MS} and min{Q∗/MS, ¯ T}
13Although aggregate world welfare does not vary with the national policies ωi and
τi as long as MSΩS + MNΩN = Q∗,t h ec o u n t r i e sf a r ed i ﬀerently under the alternative
combinations of policies that can be used to achieve global eﬃciency unless compensating
transfers take place. In particular, the welfare of the North increases and that of the
South decreases as ΩS is increased and ΩN is decreased in such a way as to keep the
weighted sum constant. It follows that, absent any international transfer payments,
the countries have a strong conﬂict of interest over the terms of an international patent
agreement.
2.2.2 Pareto-Improving Patent Agreements
How do the eﬃcient combinations of patent policies compare to the policies that emerge
in a noncooperative equilibrium? The answer to this question – which informs us about
the likely features of a negotiated patent agreement – is illustrated in Figure 1. The
ﬁgure depicts the best response functions and the eﬃcient policy combinations on the
same diagram.
In the ﬁgure, the eﬃcient policy combinations are depicted by the line QQ.15 We
show this line being situated to the right of the SS curve and above the NN curve, which
is a general feature of our model. The reasons are clear. Starting from a point on the
South’s best response function, a marginal strengthening of IPR protection in the South
increases world welfare. Such a change in Southern policies has only a second-order eﬀect
on welfare in the South, but it conveys two positive externalities to the North. First, it
provides extra monopoly proﬁts to Northern innovators, which contributes to aggregate
income there. Second, it enhances the incentives for R&D, inducing an increase in both
φS and φN. The extra product diversity that results from this R&D creates additional
surplus for Northern consumers.
while varying ΩN between ΩN =m i n {Q∗/MN, ¯ T} and max{0,
¡
Q∗ − MS ¯ T
¢
/MN} in such a way that
MSΩS + MNΩN = Q∗.
15If international transfer payments are infeasible, the set of Pareto eﬃcient policy combinations
includes the segment of the vertical axis above its intersection with QQ and extending as far as the
















Figure 1: Comparison of Nash Equilibrium and an Eﬃcient Patent Regime
By the same token, a marginal increase in the strength of Northern patent protection
from a point along NN increases world welfare. Such a change in policy enhances proﬁt
income for Southern ﬁrms and encourages additional innovation in both countries. It
follows, of course, that the QQ line must lie outside the Nash equilibrium. We record
our ﬁnding in
Proposition 2 Let (ΩS,ΩN) be an interior equilibrium in the noncooperative policy
game and let (Ω∗
S,Ω∗
N) be any eﬃcient combination of patent policies. Then MSΩ∗
S +
MNΩ∗
N >M SΩS + MNΩN.
The proposition implies that, starting from any interior Nash equilibrium, an eﬃcient
patent treaty must strengthen patent protection in at least one country. It also im-
plies that the treaty will strengthen global incentives for R&D and induce more rapid
innovation in both countries.
152.3 Patent Policy with Many Countries
In this section, we extend our analysis to a trading world with many countries. Our
main ﬁnding is that adding countries exacerbates the free-rider problem that plagues
the noncooperative policy equilibrium. Small countries are inclined to allow others to
provide the incentives for innovation so as to avoid the deadweight losses in their home
markets. In the limit, as the number of countries grows large and each one is small
in relation to the world economy, the unique Nash equilibrium has universal patents
of strength zero. Then, a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for private
innovation.
We assume that there are J countries, and that country i has market size Mi,h u m a n
capital endowment Hi, and labor productivity 1/ai. The research technology in country
i is φi = F (Hi,L Ri/ai)=A(LRi/aj)
b H
1−b
i . All consumers share the preferences given
in (1).
Suppose that there is no cooperation between nations in setting their patent policies.
In country i,e i t h e rΩi =0and the marginal cost of providing the ﬁrst bit of patent
protection exceeds the marginal beneﬁt, Ωi = ¯ T and the marginal beneﬁt of providing
the last bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal cost, or 0 < Ωi < ¯ T and the
marginal beneﬁt of strengthening patent protection equals the marginal cost. Equality
between marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost implies
Cc − Cm − μiπ =
Mi
Q
γ[ΩiCm + Cc(¯ T − Ωi)] ,( 7 )
where Q =
P
j MjΩj measures the strength of global patent protection in the Nash
equilibrium.
Observe ﬁr s tt h a ta sμi → 0, the left-hand side of (7) approaches Cc − Cm;as m a l l
country captures virtually none of the monopoly proﬁts from innovative products, so
the marginal cost of a patent per consumer and product is the diﬀerence between the
competitive and monopoly levels of consumer surplus. But as Mi → 0, the right-hand
side of (7) approaches zero, because a small country provides innovators with virtually
none of their global proﬁts and so worldwide innovation is hardly responsive to a change
16in such a country’s patent policy. It follows that a small country will set its index of
patent protection equal to zero in a Nash equilibrium.
If all countries choose positive patent strengths that are less than ¯ T, equation (7)
holds for every i. Then we can sum (7) across the J countries, which gives
J (Cc − Cm) − π = γ
⎡









Then, for a given size of the world market, Q depends only on the number of countries J
and not on the distribution of consumers and human capital across countries. Moreover,
the greater is the number of countries, the weaker are the global incentives for innova-
tion in a noncooperative equilibrium. As the number of countries grows large (holding
constant the size of the world market), the aggregate incentives for innovation approach
zero.16 Evidently, the free-rider problem becomes increasingly severe as the number of
independent decision makers in the world economy expands.
Finally, note that the requirements for global eﬃciency do not depend on the number
of countries. Again, the sum of all national welfare levels is a function of the aggregate
world incentive for innovation. This sum is maximized when
Cc − Cm − π = γ
⎡









Thus, if international compensation is possible, an eﬃcient global patent treaty will
have
P
j MjΩj = Q∗,w h e r eQ∗ is solved from (9). Notice that Q∗ must exceed Q,t h e
aggregate patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. Even if international compensation
is not feasible, an eﬃcient agreement will have
P
j MjΩj = Q∗ for a range of distributions
of world welfare.
16Suppose Q were to approach a ﬁnite number as J →∞ .T h e nγ w o u l da p p r o a c haﬁnite number
as well, and the right-hand side of (8) would be ﬁnite. But the left-hand side of (8) approaches inﬁnity
as J →∞ .
173 Extended model with trade barriers and ﬁrm-bias
The conclusion that global IPR protection is too weak in the absence of international
agreement can be met with skeptism. Many people point to the strong pharmaceutical
lobbies in Washington to justify why they think global patent protection before TRIPS
must have been already too strong rather than too weak. Moreover, the existence of
trade barriers weakens the international spillovers that one nation confers on foreign
countries when it strengthens domestic IPR protection. Therefore, I address here two
key simpliﬁcations of the basic model: that governments put equal weights on consumer
welfare and ﬁrm proﬁts and that there are no trade barriers. In reality, governments
are often biased in favor of domestic ﬁrms and trade barriers are non-trivial. Omitting
these factors can bias the conclusion that global IPR protection is too weak in the non-
cooperative equilibrium. Obviously, whether the conclusion of the basic model can be
overturned depends on how large are the magnitudes of these two eﬀects. The analytical
task is to ﬁnd out what values of ﬁrm-biasedness and trade barriers can sustain the
original conclusion that there is under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium, and then
judge whether these values are plausible.
Let y be the probability that an invention by a domestic ﬁrm is sold in a foreign
market (call it the “import penetration rate”). This is an inverse measure of foreign
trade barriers. Let 1+a be the weight a government puts on domestic proﬁts when
a weight of one is put on domestic consumer surplus in its objective function. The
parameter a measures the ﬁr m - b i a so fg o v e r n m e n t s .N o t et h a tt h i sa p p r o a c ho fa s s i g n i n g
additional exogenous weight to ﬁr m sa so p p o s e dt oc o n s u m e r si ss i m i l a rt ow h a ti sd o n e
by Bagwell and Staiger (2002). They essentially put a weight of 1+a on ﬁrms in the
government’s objective function, which they treat as a reduced form derived from the
analysis of a political-economy equilibrium a la Grossman and Helpman (1994). Let vi






It is useful to consider a multi-country setting, as the number of independent decision-
making governments plays a crucial role in whether there is under-protection of IP in
18Nash equilibrium. Let there be J countries in the set N of countries in the world. In a





















where fi ≡ CcT − (Cc − Cm)Ωi is the present discounted value of per-person consumer
surplus derived from a diﬀerentiated good over its product life. The left-hand side of the
above equation is, in fact, the marginal cost per consumer in country i of strengthening
IPR there. The ﬁrst term is the loss in consumer surplus attributed to inventions from
ﬁrms outside country i; the second term is the loss of consumer surplus attributed to
inventions from country i; and the third term is the oﬀsetting of the losses of consumer
surplus by gains in proﬁts of ﬁr m si nc o u n t r yi . T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei st h em a r g i n a l
beneﬁt per consumer in country i. The ﬁrst term is the increase in consumer welfare
in country i due to increases in ﬂows of innovations from ﬁrms outside country i; the
second term is the increase in consumer welfare in country i due to the increase in ﬂow
of innovation from country i. If I deﬁne the left-hand side as MCi(a) and the right-
hand side as MBi,t h e n 1
Mi
∂Wi(a)
∂Ωi = MBi −MCi(a),w h e r eWi (a) is the Government i’s
objective function. (Hereinafter, I put an argument ‘a’a f t e rt h en a m eo faf u n c t i o ni f
ﬁrm-bias aﬀects the value of the function.)
It can be easily shown that the ﬁrst-order condition for global welfare maximization


























The left-hand side of this equation is the marginal global cost borne by each consumer
in country i of strengthening IPR protection in that country. The second term is the
19welfare that will not be taken into account when IPR protection in country i is chosen
to maximize global welfare instead of to maximize government i’s ﬁrm-biased objective
(therefore it is an addition to marginal cost); the third term reduces the global marginal
cost as it takes into account the increases in proﬁts of ﬁrms outside of country i. The
right-hand side is the marginal global beneﬁt (per consumer in country i) of strengthening
IPR there. The second term and the third term are both increases in welfare of consumers
outside of country i. The second term is due to faster foreign innovations, while the third
term is due to faster domestic innovations. (“foreign” and “domestic” here are relative
to each country outside of country i.) The cross-border externalities of IPR protection
are captured by the third term on the left hand side plus the second and third terms on
the right hand side. It is apparent that since an increase in trade barriers (a decrease
in y) leads to less international spillovers, the likelihood of under-protection of IPR in
equilibrium is lower. Likewise, an increase in ﬁrm-bias (an increase in a) reduces the gap
between marginal global beneﬁt and marginal national beneﬁt, making under-protection
of IPR less likely.
L e tu sd e ﬁn et h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h eﬁrst order condition above as MCw
i and the
right hand side of the equation as MBw





i ,w h e r e
Ww is world welfare (without bias towards ﬁrm proﬁts).
In the basic model, we can ﬁnd a functional relationship between the global strength
of patent protection and global welfare. The same strength of global patent protection
creates the same amount of total deadweight losses (what I call static losses) and ag-
gregate ﬂow of new diﬀerentiated goods (what I call dynamic gains) in each period. As
long as the global strength of patent protection is the same, global welfare is the same,
regardless of the combination of individual countries’ strengths of patent protection.
Therefore, the global optimum is a continuum of combinations of national strengths of
patent protection that maximize global welfare. However, this will not be true in this
extended model. In this more general model with trade barriers, there does not exist
a scalar measure of the global strength of patent protection such that there is a func-
tional relationship between the global strength of protection and global welfare. Despite
this problem, I am able to calculate a suﬃcient condition for global under-protection of
20patents, as shown below.
Id e ﬁne under-protection as a situation when, starting from Nash equilibrium, global
welfare increases as a result of some positive changes in all {Ωi}i∈N (where the mag-
nitudes of increase are not necessarily equal). The point of the analysis is to come up





i∈N,s o m e
coordinated increases in IPR protection of all countries is globally welfare-improving.
Note that an increase in the strength of protection in all countries raises the values
of all patents. This increases the global deadweight losses, but gives a boost to the
rate of innovation. To simplify the analysis, I focus on changes in {Ωi}i∈N such that
MidΩi = dΩ for all i.I w a n t t o ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition under which such changes
lead to an increase in global welfare. In other words, I seek a condition under which the
marginal global beneﬁt outweighs the marginal global cost.
Bear in mind that equation (10) is equivalent to 1
Mi
∂Wi(a)
∂Ωi =0 , and equation (11)
is equivalent to 1
Mi
∂Ww
∂Ωi =0 . Summing the left-hand side and the right-hand side of
equations (10) over all i as well as both sides of (11) over all i, and comparing the two
ensuing equations, it can be shown that
(J − 1)y>a (12)
is a suﬃcient condition under which, starting from Nash equilibrium, small increases in
Ωi such that dΩi = dΩ
Mi is globally welfare-improving, i.e. dWw
dΩ > 0.T h ep r o o fi sg i v e n
below (and the appendix).
First I prove the following lemma:





















































dΩ > 0.T h a t




Mi for all i 6= j.
This clearly indicates under-protection at Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since
∂Wi(a)
∂Ωi =0






∂Ωi =0includes the Nash equilibrium as a special
case. ¥
To understand Lemma 1 better, let us consider a two-country case. First refer to
Figure 2 for an idea of the relationship between Nash equilibrium and global optimum.
In that diagram, point E is the Nash equilibrium while point G is the global optimum.
BRF-S and BRF-N are the best response functions of South and North respectively.
Point G is at the intersection of the curves ∂Ww
∂ΩS =0and ∂Ww
∂ΩN =0 ,w h i c ha r en o ts h o w n .
Note that the slopes of the iso-global-welfare lines Ww = W are always equal to
MS
MN at





























MN. Consequently, it is not hard to see that starting from any point





MN would increase Ww. In the context of Figure 2, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for there to be under-protection in Nash equilibrium is that point E is to the
left of the curve GG.17 Lemma 1 says that the suﬃcient condition for point E to be on






























∂ΩN =0(EE). The curves FOC-S and FOC-N are the ﬁrst order
conditions for maximization of global welfare with respect to the choice of ΩS and ΩN
respectively. In the context of Figure 3, the above condition is equivalent to saying that
the curve EE is to the left of curve GG. If this condition is satisﬁed, at any point that
lies on EE (including the Nash equilibrium point E), any small change in ΩS and ΩN







17Note that if point E is to the right of GG, then any simultaneous small decrease of ΩS and ΩN
such that dΩN
dΩS = MS
MN would increase Ww.
22Proposition 3 below basically provides a suﬃcient condition for the EE to be on the left
of GG.
Therefore, our next step is to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3. As u ﬃcient condition for under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium
when there are trade barriers and ﬁrm-bias is (J − 1)y>a .
Proof. See the appendix.
L e m m a1p r o v i d e sas u ﬃcient condition for under-protection in the sense that starting




Mi for all i 6= j leads to an increase in global welfare. Proposition 3 says that
(J − 1)y>ais a suﬃcient condition for lemma 1 to hold. Therefore, it is exactly the
condition we are looking for. To check that this is a reasonable condition, note that
in the special case of the basic model, when there are two countries (J =2 ), y =1
and a =0 , the condition is satisﬁed. Moreover, it accords with the intuition that the
free-rider problem gets more serious when there are more countries playing the patent-
setting game, for a larger J leads to more under-protection. It also is consistent with
the notions that trade barriers weaken the cross-border externality of IPR protection,
because a smaller y leads to less under-protection, and that stronger government bias
towards patent-holding ﬁrms tends to strengthen patents, for a larger a leads to less
under-protection.18
What is a reasonable value for a? In the political-economy literature (Grossman and
Helpman 1994; Maggi and Goldberg 1999), researchers have tried to estimate the weight
the U.S. government puts on campaign contributions when it puts a weight of unity on
welfare. They rarely come up with a number more than 0.5. Since this is a preference
parameter, it should be the same in the context of patent protection. Suppose there is a
patent lobby, and suppose there is no consumer lobby, nor is there lobbying from other
18As an additional check, one can examine the symmetric case where Mi = Mj and Hi = Hj for all
i 6= j.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h es a m es u ﬃcient condition is obtained.
23sectors of the economy. Based on these suppositions, the appendix shows that the value
the government puts on campaign contributions is exactly the same as a in our model.
What is a reasonable value for J? This is the number of independent government
decision-makers in the patent-setting game. Thus, it is the number of countries in the
world that consume and trade patent-sensitive goods, and that adopt neither zero nor
full patent protection. To be conservative, let J =5 .
When a =0 .5 and J =5 ,as u ﬃcient condition for the Nash equilibrium to be
under-protecting patents is y>0.1. I believe that this condition is likely to be satisﬁed
for most products. So, based on this rough calculation, I conclude that global patent
protection in the absence of international coordination is probably too weak.
Some people argue that the set of globally optimal levels of patent protection should
take into account the politically-augmented objective function of each national govern-
ment, as these functions reﬂect the preferences of each government, which represents each
country in international coordination eﬀorts. If maximizing the sum of the politically-
augmented objective functions is the goal of international coordination, then the ﬁrst


























In this case, it is clear that there is under-protection of patents in each country, as
the marginal global cost is lower while the marginal global beneﬁti sh i g h e r . T h e r ei s
unambiguous positive cross-border externalities as the proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms and the
increases consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced innovations are not taken
into account as Ωi increases, just like in the basic model. The spillovers are smaller in
this case, as there are trade barriers.
244 No National Treatment in Nash Equilibrium
One may argue that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, there is no incentive for a country
to oﬀer national treatment. One response to this criticism is that, before the TRIPS
Agreement was signed and implemented, many countries were already members of WIPO
and the Berne and Paris Conventions. These treaties required their members to adopt
national treatment. A critique of this response is that these treaties were so loosely en-
forced that countries did not really abide by that commitment. Does the main conclusion
that there is under-protection continue to hold if I relax the assumption of national treat-
m e n t ?I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h ea n s w e ri s ,“ y e s ” .M o r e o v e r ,t h er e s u l t si nt h eb a s i cm o d e l ,
such as: A larger country has incentives to oﬀer more IPR protection, and the positive
cross-border externalities of strengthening domestic IPR protection, continue to exist.
I ﬁrst compute the Nash equilibrium. I continue to assume the existence of trade
barriers and ﬁrm-bias. Let Ωkj be the strength of protection oﬀered by country k on
goods invented by country j,w h e r ek,j = N. The value of a patent of a good invented






= πQj where Qj ≡
MjΩjj +
P
k6=j yMkΩkj is the global patent protection provided to each diﬀerentiated
g o o dd e v e l o p e di nc o u n t r yj .F o c u s i n go nt h ep r o t e c t i o no fg o o d si n v e n t e db yc o u n t r y
j, the best-response function of that country gives the optimal choice of Ωjj given that
each country i (where i 6= j) chooses Ωij. That function is





;( 1 3 )
where fjj ≡ CcT−(Cc − Cm)Ωjj; while the best-response function of country i, selecting
its best choice of Ωij given that country j chooses Ωjj and each country k in the rest of
the world (where k 6= i,j) chooses Ωkj,i s





(There are J − 1 such equation) (14)
where fij ≡ CcT − (Cc − Cm)Ωij.
Note that the innovative capability of a country does not aﬀect its equilibrium
strength of IPR protection when countries can optimally choose to oﬀer diﬀerential
25treatments to domestic and foreign ﬁrms. If one adds equations (13) and the J − 1
equations (14) for all i 6= j,w eh a v e












− (Cc − Cm)Qj
#
(15)
Therefore, the global patent protection Qj provided to all diﬀerentiated goods are the
same regardless of where they are developed. As vj = πQj, the equilibrium value of a
patent is independent of where the good is invented. Since vi = vj for all i 6= j,w ec a n
infer from (13) that a country with a larger domestic market tends to protect the IPR of
domestically-invented goods more than one with a smaller domestic market. Moreover,
(14) implies that a country with a larger domestic market tends to protect the IPR of
foreign-invented goods more than one with a smaller domestic market. Finally, if we
compare the best response function for the choice of Ωjj with that for the choice of Ωji,
we can easily infer that a country always protects domestically invented goods more
than it does foreign-invented ones (i.e., Ωjj > Ωji for i 6= j).
The globally eﬃcient combinations of Ωjj and Ωij for all i 6= j, on the other hand,
are determined by the following equation






















− (Cc − Cm)Qj
#
(16)
Like in the basic model, instead of being unique, there is a continuum of globally optimal
combination of levels of patent protection. Considering the two-country case, it is clear
that harmonization (in the sense that Ωii = Ωjj) is certainly not suﬃcient for global
eﬃciency. Neither is it necessary, since Qj can be at the eﬃciency level with Ωij small
and Ωjj large, or with Ωij large but Ωjj small. Similarly, Ωii can be either large or
small to attain global eﬃciency. Therefore, there is no need for Ωii = Ωjj to reach
global eﬃciency. Along similar lines, it is easy to see that national treatment is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for global eﬃciency.
Comparing equations (15) and (16) can give us a suﬃcient condition for global under-
protection in Nash equilibrium. We state the result in the following proposition.
26Proposition 4. As u ﬃcient condition for under-protection when there are trade barri-
ers, ﬁrm-bias and no requirement of national treatment in Nash equilibrium is J−1 >a .
Proof. Unlike in the case where national treatment is observed in Nash equilibrium,
the strength of global patent protection is the same regardless of the combination of
individual countries’ strengths of patent protection. This is like in the basic model. To
compare the equilibrium global strength of patent protection with the globally optimal
one, we simply compare equations (15) and (16). It is easy to see that the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for global under-protection of patents is
J (Cc − Cm) − (1 + a)π>C c − Cm − π
⇐⇒ (J − 1)(Cc − Cm) >a π
=⇒ J − 1 >asince Cc − Cm >π ¥
This is a less stringent condition than (12).19 Interestingly, the condition is indepen-
dent of y.
To conclude, the non-observance of national treatment in non-cooperative equilib-
rium will make it even more likely that there is under-protection of patents in the global
economy.
5C o n c l u s i o n
I extend the Grossman and Lai (2004) model to answer the question, “Would global
patent protection be too weak without international coordination?” by introducing ﬁrm-
biased government preferences and trade barriers in the model. I make use of the esti-
mates of a parameter from the political economy literature to proxy for the degree of
19If we assume that a and y are both country-speciﬁc so that in general aj 6= ak and yj 6= yk for
j 6= k, then the suﬃcient condition for under-protection becomes
J − 1 >a j
This, again, is a less stringent condition than (12).
27governments’ ﬁr m - b i a s . T h e nIc a l c u l a t et h er a n g eo ft r a d eb a r r i e r st h a ti ss u ﬃcient
to give rise to under-protection of patents in the global system without international
policy coordination in IPR protection. I make the judgement that the true trade bar-
rier between countries very likely falls within this range of under-protection. Therefore,
I conclude that there was probably under-protection of patents without international
policy coordination in IPR protection. It means that the free-rider problem with a
large number of independent players overrides the eﬀects of ﬁrm-bias and trade barriers,
giving rise to too low a rate of innovation in the world. Allowing for the possibility
that countries discriminate against foreign ﬁrms in Nash equilibrium does not change
this conclusion. The problem can possibly be corrected by international coordination in
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.
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30Appendix
AT h e ﬁrm-bias parameter and political economy
In this appendix, we try to justify using the parameter estimated from the political
economy literature (in particular lobbying as per Grossman and Helpman 1994) as a
proxy for the ﬁrm-bias parameter a in our model. We analyze lobbying when there are
two or more countries, which trade freely with each other and set their national patent
policies non-cooperatively. We introduce the “rest of the world” to a generic country j.
For ease of exposition, we only focus on the case with free trade, i.e. y =1 . The case
with y<1 has the same expressions for the marginal cost, which is the focus of what
we want to show here. Therefore, there is no loss generality by assuming y =1here.
The setup in this appendix is based on what we presented in Section 2. Here, we ex-
tend the model by considering the possibility that interest groups lobby the government
to set policy in their favor. In particular, the IPR industry has a strong self-interest in
obtaining extensive IPR protection. We follow the recent “protection for sale” litera-
ture20 in modelling the interaction between the IPR-lobby and the government. That
is, we set up a lobbying game that is based on the menu auction approach of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986): In such a game, the IPR lobby submits a contribution schedule
CIP(τ) to the policy-maker who then chooses the optimal patent length τ.
Let us start with a closed economy. The IPR-lobby represents the interests of the
owners of human capital H that, in the Grossman-Lai model, is employed exclusively
in the production of new designs of diﬀerentiated goods. Deﬁning r as the returns to
human capital, the income of these capital owners is rH, which is the residual of the
revenue from IPR-sensitive products minus the labor costs necessary to produce them:
rH = MφπΩ − wLR, (17)
where M is the number of consumers, φ is the ﬂow of new inventions, π is the instanta-
neous proﬁtp e rp r o d u c t ,Ω ≡ (1 − e−ρτ/ρ) is the present discounted value of a ﬂow of
20See the seminal contribution by Grossman and Helpman (1994) that represents the starting point
of this literature.
31one dollar during the patent life τ of the product, w is wage, and LR the labor employed
in the R&D sector. In this appendix, we assume that patents are perfectly enforced so
that patent length completely captures the degree of patent protection. The IPR lobby








which is the discounted present value of its ﬂow of proﬁts. Note that we consider neither
a labor union nor a consumer lobby. Workers in this framework are paid their marginal
product and thus have no surplus to lobby and we could not ﬁnd any empirical evidence
for the role of consumers’ interests.
Taking into account the contribution schedule of the IPR-lobby, it is the government
that will set policy. Its objective function takes the following form:
W (a)=W(0) + aCIP(τ). (18)
As usual in the “protection for sale” literature, the government’s objective is a weighted
sum of social welfare and contributions. The ﬁrst term represents social welfare and can





Mφ[CmΩ + Cc(T − Ω)]
ρ
.
where T ≡ (1 − e−ρ
_
τ/ρ) is the present discounted value of a ﬂow of one dollar during
the economic lifetime
_
τ of the product. The second term in equation (18) represents the
inﬂuence of the lobbying contribution and a indicates the importance of this channel.
Now let us consider an open economy with free trade. In an open economy, the









The set {−j} represents the rest of the world, which consists of more than one country.
In that case, all variables with a subscript “−j” are vectors that represent the values of
the variable of the rest of the world, with the number of rows equal to the number of
countries in the rest of the world. Note the additional middle term in the above equation
32represents the proﬁts from the foreign market. Next, let us redeﬁne Wj(0), which now











(φj + φ−j)Mj(T − Ωj)Cc
ρ
As in the closed economy case, the government in country j maximizes a weighted sum
of (appropriately modiﬁed) social welfare Wj(0) plus the contributions it is oﬀered:
W
j (a)=Wj(0) + aC
j
IP(τj)
We use the menu auction approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), in particular,
conditions 2 and 3 of (their) Lemma 2:
ii) τ0 ∈ argmaxτj Wj(0) + aC
j
IP(τj)







Using in addition the standard assumption that the contribution schedule C
j
IP(τj) is









The resulting best-response function of country j’s government can be written as:





CmΩj + Cc(¯ T − Ωj)
¤
where v is the value of a global patent. Note the similarity with equations (3) and (4),
with additional weight given to the IPR-sensitive sector’s proﬁts. In our model, this
extra weight arises as the result of lobbying.
Taking into account the property that γj = γ−j = γ under a Cobb-Douglas innova-
tion function, the following best response function implicitly deﬁnes the Nash equilib-
rium:









33where μj ≡ φj/(φj +φ−j) is the share of world innovation originating in country j.N o t e
the similarity with equation (5).
B Proof of Proposition 3








φj +( 1− y)φi
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Recall that equation (10) is equivalent to 1
Mi
∂Wi(a)




























































34The above inequality is equivalent to
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in (22), we get a suﬃcient






































which is equivalent to
θ2 [(a + y) − Jy] <y
2 (J − 1)[Jy+( 1− y) − (1 + a)θ2]
as u ﬃcient condition of which is
(a + y) − Jy <y
2 (J − 1)[Jy− (a + y)] since θ2 < 1
which is equivalent to
(J − 1)y>a
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